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Abortion and
Compelled
Physician Speech
David Orentlicher

A

s states increasingly impose informed consent
mandates on abortion providers, the required
disclosures bring two well-established legal
doctrines into conflict — the First Amendment’s
freedom of speech and the physician’s duty to obtain
informed consent.
On one hand, the First Amendment provides for
a broad freedom of speech, under which government may neither prevent people from voicing their
own views, nor compel individuals to voice the government’s views. As the Supreme Court observed in
Wooley v. Maynard,1 the First Amendment protects
“both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all.”2 When legislatures tell physicians what they must disclose to their patients, the
physicians lose their right not to speak.
On the other hand, legislatures and courts can insist
that physicians properly explain to patients about
their medical conditions and potential treatments
so patients can make informed decisions about their
health care. Patients lack the medical expertise necessary to make informed decisions on their own; hence,
the law requires physicians to disclose material information to patients as part of the decision making process. Physicians are free to speak or not to speak outside of their professional roles. But when taking care
of patients, doctors assume a duty to speak, as well as
a duty to speak responsibly.3
The duty of physicians to speak to their patients has
unique features, but it also has much in common with
the duties of other professionals to speak to those with
whom they have a fiduciary relationship. For example,
under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4, lawyers must “promptly inform” clients of decisions for
which client consent is required,4 they must keep clients “reasonably informed” about the status of their
representation,5 and they must explain matters “to
the extent reasonably necessary” for clients “to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.”6
Similarly, the Uniform Trust Code requires trustees
to keep beneficiaries “reasonably informed about the
administration of the trust and of the material facts
necessary for them to protect their interests.”7 Trustees
also must provide to the beneficiaries at least once a
year “a report of the trust property, liabilities, receipts,
and disbursements, including the source and amount
of the trustee’s compensation, a listing of the trust
assets and, if feasible, the market value of the trust’s
assets.”8
David Orentlicher, M.D., J.D., is the Samuel R. Rosen Professor and Co-Director at the Hall Center for Law and Health,
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law, and
an Adjunct Professor of Medicine at the Indiana University
School of Medicine.
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Ordinarily, the doctrines of free speech and informed
consent coexist without much difficulty. Courts rarely
feel the need to discuss the First Amendment implications of informed consent mandates.9
But as states have expanded the kinds of information that abortion providers must disclose to pregnant
women, First Amendment concerns have become
increasingly salient. Indeed, in 2011, a three-judge
panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit struck down part of an informed consent mandate from the South Dakota legislature on the ground
that it violated the free speech rights of physicians.10
Under the South Dakota law, physicians are required
to disclose “all known medical risks” of abortion,
including the existence of an “[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.”11 Because studies have not
found that having an abortion increases the risk for
suicide, the court concluded that the provision “violates doctors’ First Amendment right to be free from
compelled speech that is untruthful, misleading, or
irrelevant.”12 While the court’s decision was reversed
by an en banc decision of the Eighth Circuit,13 the
mandate raises serious concerns. In this article, I will
use several examples of informational mandates or
other required physician speech to identify principles
for distinguishing between legitimate regulation of
the informed consent process and illegitimate interference with the freedom of speech.14
Courts and other scholars have suggested a number of bases for distinguishing between permissible
and impermissible health mandates. For example, as
the Eighth Circuit observed, physicians should not be
compelled to deliver untruthful speech.15 Courts and
commentators also have worried about speech that
is too graphic16 or that is designed to manipulate the
patient’s decision making.17
Perhaps, the best way to conceptualize the problem
is to view the doctrine of informed consent as a carveout from standard First Amendment doctrine.18 As
long as the state is mandating speech that serves the
goals of informed consent, the requirements should
not raise First Amendment concerns. However, when
the mandates deviate from informed consent principles, they should receive the usual “strict scrutiny” for
laws that compel speech by individuals and ordinarily
be struck down.19
In practice, this conceptualization results in two
rules that typify much of the analysis in judicial decisions and academic commentary. First, abortion
speech mandates should be permissible when they
provide material information to patients about the
abortion decision. If the state is trying to ensure that
patients are fully informed, the mandates should be
allowed. As a corollary, the information must be truth10

ful and not be misleading.20 The goal is to inform not
to misinform. Second, speech mandates that pertain
to the morality of abortion should not be permitted.
Rather than informing the patient’s decision, these
mandates force the physician or other health professional to espouse the state’s ideology.21
As indicated, courts and legal scholars have proposed other ways to distinguish permissible from
impermissible mandates. However, these additional
distinctions raise their own concerns and should not
be needed. If courts strictly apply the requirements
that compelled speech pertain to medical facts about
abortion and its alternatives rather than abortion ideology and that the compelled speech be truthful and
not misleading, then the interests of pregnant women
and their physicians should be protected.

Informed Consent Mandates in Health Care
While many of the legislative mandates for abortion
informed consent are problematic, some concerns
about “abortion exceptionalism” are misplaced. Critics often worry that abortion is singled out for special
treatment,22 but informed consent statutes in health
care are not unique to abortion. Legislatures have
imposed disclosure requirements for several other
medical decisions.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, concern about breast
cancer treatment led a number of states to impose
informed consent mandates on physicians.23 The concern arose over the extent to which surgeons were recommending radical mastectomy for early stage cancers without suggesting that their patients consider
the breast-conserving alternative of a lumpectomy,
typically followed by radiation.24 In other words, if
the cancer were still small and localized, the surgeon
could remove the tumor and a small amount of surrounding tissue rather than removing the entire
breast. To ensure that women understand their treatment options, many state legislatures adopted statutes
requiring greater disclosure of information to patients
about the alternative treatments.25
These mandates do not raise meaningful First
Amendment concerns. It is reasonable for the state
to ensure that patients are fully informed about their
treatment options, especially when patients are dealing with a treatment that can be disfiguring and a disease that could be lethal.
Supporters of abortion speech mandates make a
similar argument. Before women undergo abortion, it
is important that they truly understand their reproductive options, especially since the choice of abortion
means that the fetus will not survive.26
But are there important differences between the
breast cancer mandates and the abortion mandates?
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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For example, the abortion speech mandates seem
much more specific than the breast cancer mandates
about the information that should be disclosed. At one
time, the Supreme Court worried that rigid requirements to disclose a specific body of information would
impose an “uncomfortable straitjacket” on physicians
performing abortions.27 If one looks just at the statutory text for the mandates, it appears that legislatures
mandate a much greater degree of specificity for abortion than for breast cancer treatment. While the abortion mandates often prescribe a detailed “script” for
physicians,28 breast cancer statutes typically reiterate
the basic doctrine of informed consent. For example,
a California statute simply requires that patients be
informed about “the advantages, disadvantages, risks,
and descriptions of the procedures with regard to
medically viable and efficacious alternative methods
of treatment for breast cancer.”29 However, the statute also requires physicians to satisfy their disclosure
requirements by giving patients a brochure developed
by the California Department of Public Health.30 The
current version of the brochure provides 35 pages of
information to patients.31 Other states have even longer
informational brochures for breast cancer patients,32
although these states may not require physicians to
use the brochure but instead may state that the brochure satisfies the physician’s duty of disclosure.33
There is an important way in which the breast
cancer statutes differ from the abortion mandates.
Although the breast cancer statutes were enacted
to encourage greater use of breast-conserving treatment, they generally represent less of an effort to push
the patient’s decision in one direction or another.34
While the breast cancer laws require disclosure of
information regarding all of the treatment options,
the abortion statutes typically emphasize information about the risks of abortion and the benefits of
childbirth.35
Still, abortion speech mandates are not the only
speech mandates that promote one decision over
another. For example, most states in the 1980s
enacted provisions for “required request” to increase
the number of organ transplants. Required request
laws applied to patients who died in a hospital, were
suitable candidates for organ donation, and did not
decide about posthumous organ donation while alive.
For these patients, a hospital representative36 was
required to inform family members about their option
to authorize donation and also to request the family
to consent to donation. So speech was compelled, and
it was compelled with a bias. Hospital personnel not
only would inform family members about organ donation, they also would push for a decision to donate.37

For an example of another kind of informed consent mandate that gets fairly specific and that evinces
a bias (in this case against the proposed treatment),
consider requirements for consent to electroconvulsive treatment (ECT) for major depression or other
psychiatric disorders. About 40 percent of states have
such mandates.38 Under Colorado’s statute, physicians
must notify patients about
The nature, degree, duration, and probability
of the side effects and significant risks of [ECT]
commonly known by the medical profession,
especially noting the possible degree and duration of memory loss, the possibility of permanent
irrevocable memory loss, and the remote possibility of death.39
Patients also must be told about “reasonable alternative treatments and why the physician is recommending electroconvulsive treatment” and that “there is a
difference of opinion within the medical profession on
the use of electroconvulsive treatment.”40 On the other
hand, the Colorado statute does not require physicians
to discuss the nature, degree, duration, and probability of the side effects and significant risks of alternative
treatments.
While abortion mandates are not as exceptional as
some writers suggest, abortion exceptionalism makes
sense to a certain extent — abortion entails an action
that will end the life of a fetus and the potential life of
a child.41 When a potential life is ended, greater care
should be taken than for medical decisions that have
less serious implications. Consider in this regard that
when state legislatures have authorized physician “aid
in dying,”42 they have imposed a number of requirements that can make it difficult for patients to exercise
their aid-in-dying right. For example, patients must
endure a two-week waiting period between the time of
their first request for aid in dying and their ability to
receive a prescription for a lethal dose of drug.43 They
also must see a second physician for confirmation of
their eligibility for aid in dying. In addition, the statutes impose special disclosure requirements that are
not seen for other medical decisions.44 For example,
Oregon requires physicians to “inform the patient that
he or she has an opportunity to rescind the request at
any time and in any manner, and offer the patient an
opportunity to rescind at the end of the 15-day waiting
period.”45
Similarly, in states that allow mature minors to make
health care decisions, courts may impose stricter standards for decisions whether to forgo life-sustaining
medical treatment than for other decisions. According
to the Illinois Supreme Court, for example, the govern-
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ment’s interest in imposing its judgment on the minor
“will vary depending upon the nature of the medical
treatment involved. Where the health care issues are
potentially life threatening, the State’s parens patriae
interest is greater than if the health care matter is less
consequential.”46 Or consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts47 for another
example of greater deference to the state’s interests
when a health care decision can result in death. In

Of course, legislative mandates for informed consent will not always reflect a genuine effort to insure
that physicians disclose all material information to
their patients. At times, as is the case with some of
the abortion mandates, legislators will be trying to
prevent patients from making a disfavored decision.
Accordingly, courts need standards by which to distinguish legitimate speech mandates from illegitimate
speech mandates.
The Supreme Court has required
that mandated speech be truthful
The Supreme Court has required that mandated
and not misleading.54 Are there
speech
mandates that are truthful
speech be truthful and not misleading. Are there
and not misleading, but neverthespeech mandates that are truthful and not misleading, less are problematic? We can turn
but nevertheless are problematic? We can turn to
to some examples of mandated
abortion speech to answer this
some examples of mandated abortion speech to
question.

answer this question.

that case, Henning Jacobson refused to be immunized against small pox, despite a local public health
regulation requiring vaccination.48 The Supreme Court
upheld mandatory immunization, and it did so without giving any special weight to Mr. Jacobson’s autonomy interests. Rather than employing strict scrutiny
or another form of heightened scrutiny, the Court
analyzed the ordinance through rational basis review.
According to the Court, the regulation was not so arbitrary or unreasonable that it should be invalidated.49
In other words, while abortion speech mandates
seem to violate principles of equality when they
impose disclosure requirements that are not typically
seen elsewhere, the equality argument runs into the
fact that abortion really is different in a very meaningful way from other medical procedures. It would be
surprising if the rules for abortion were the same as
the rules for an appendectomy.50
As the different examples of health care speech mandates indicate, there often are good reasons for legislatures to require specific disclosures of information by
physicians. Common law principles of informed consent generally work well to protect patients, but not
always. And this is particularly the case in the many
states that rely on professional standards to define the
scope of the physician’s duty to disclose information to
their patients.51 Doctors are very much devoted to the
welfare of their patients, but their own interests may
interfere with their duty to serve their patients’ interests.52 Accordingly, we should expect that at times, the
common law may not compel adequate disclosures by
physicians to their patients.53

12

Speech Mandates for Abortion
At one time, speech mandates for abortion were limited and covered ground that was quite consistent
with principles of informed consent. For example, in
the law challenged in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Pennsylvania required
physicians to provide material medical information
about abortion and the alternative of childbirth.55
Before an abortion, pregnant women were to be told
about the nature of the proposed abortion procedure
and its risks, the risks with carrying the fetus to term,
and the probable gestational age of the fetus.56 All of
these requirements would make for a more informed
decision about the woman’s choice. Patients typically
want to know about benefits and risks of a proposed
procedure, as well as the benefits and risks of alternative treatments. The gestational age of the fetus
would affect the risks from abortion, and it also might
influence a woman’s choice about abortion. For some
women, it may be easier to abort a very young fetus
than an older fetus.57
Under the Pennsylvania law, women also were to
be told that information was available about agencies that offered alternatives to abortion, that medical assistance benefits might be available to defray the
costs of pregnancy and childbirth, and that the father
might be responsible for child support payments.58 In
other words, to the extent that financial considerations
were relevant to the woman’s decision, she was able to
better understand the economic trade-offs between
abortion and childbirth.
The Casey Court upheld the disclosure requirements on the grounds that they mandated information
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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that was truthful and non-misleading and that would
make for a fully informed decision by the woman.59
Although the holding represented a departure from
the Court’s past rejection of speech mandates for abortion,60 the Casey Court’s approach fits well under the
doctrine of informed consent.
In the past few years, however, some states have
adopted speech mandates that are not based on traditional principles of informed consent. As discussed
above, a number of legislatures have required physicians to disclose information that is inaccurate. For
example, when women are told that having an abortion will increase their risk of suicide, they are being
misled. Accordingly, a suicide risk mandate cannot
be justified under principles of informed consent and
should be found to violate the First Amendment.61
Other misleading mandates include information that
abortion is linked with an increased risk of breast
cancer.62
In addition to misleading speech, many states
require ideological speech. South Dakota and some
other states require physicians to tell patients that an
abortion will “terminate the life of a whole, separate,
unique, living human being.”63 This mandate forces
the physician to take sides on moral questions that
are very much disputed. For example, there is much
debate on the question whether the fetus is a “separate” entity or is part of the woman. Similarly, there is
considerable controversy on the question whether the
fetus has the status of a “human being” or is morally
different from an infant.
Ideological speech mandates should fall outside the
informed consent carve out for compelled speech.64
They do not serve the goals of ensuring that patients
understand the benefits and risks of abortion or the
alternative of childbirth. Rather, they require physicians to promote the state’s views on the propriety of
a controversial public policy. As the Supreme Court
wrote in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,65 no government official may try to “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein.”66 Accordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a woman’s informed consent claim that her physician should
have told her before her abortion that her embryo
“was a complete, separate, unique and irreplaceable
human being,” or that abortion involves “killing an
existing human being.”67
Moreover, with ideological speech mandates, the
government can exploit the trust of patients in their
physicians to lend credibility to its message.68 And
that corrupts the fiduciary relationship between
patient and physician. Patients rely on physicians for

their expertise and judgment with the understanding
that physicians will use their expertise and judgment
to promote the interests of their patients.69 With ideological speech mandates, the government forces physicians to use their expertise and judgment to promote
the interests of the state. We would not want Congress
or the Obama administration to compel physicians to
advocate on behalf of the right to health care under the
Affordable Care Act when informing their patients.
Similarly, legislatures should not require physicians to
advocate against a right to abortion. In other words,
the ideological speech mandates for abortion are akin
to the compelled speech struck down by the Supreme
Court in Wooley v. Maynard.70
To be sure, as the Casey Court indicated, the state
need not remain silent about the woman’s decision
whether to abort or carry her fetus to term. The state is
entitled to try to persuade pregnant women to choose
childbirth. But when it tries to do so with ideological
speech, it must do so without forcing physicians — or
other individuals — to deliver its message.

Interpretive Issues
While the principles of truthful speech mandates and
non-ideological mandates provide good standards,
they suffer from the usual imprecision of legal standards. Judges can come to different conclusions about
the application of speech mandate standards, and
indeed they have applied the standards in different
ways.
Consider, for example, the contrast between the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit’s 2008
opinion in Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North
Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds71 and the 2014 opinion in National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC72
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In
both cases, plaintiffs challenged speech mandates
on grounds that the mandates compelled ideological
speech. The D.C. Circuit gave the government much
less leeway than did the Eighth Circuit on the ideological speech question.
The D.C. Circuit issued its decision in the context
of disclosures to consumers by sellers of goods. In
National Association of Manufacturers, the court
rejected a speech mandate for producers of goods that
use the kinds of minerals that are mined in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Congress was concerned
about the extent to which armed groups fighting each
other in the Congo war were financing their operations
with gold and other minerals from eastern Congo.73
Accordingly, users of minerals that could have come
from the Congo were required to determine whether
their minerals did in fact come from the Congo. If so,
they were required to disclose on their websites that
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their products were not free from minerals mined in
the Democratic Republic of Congo.74 In the government’s view, it was simply requiring companies to
make a factual disclosure about the components of
their goods — were the minerals from the Congo, or
were they from other countries? Indeed, country of
origin disclosures are common for other businesses.
For example, federal law requires groceries to disclose
the country of origin of the meats, fish, fruits, vegetables, and nuts that they sell.75 Nevertheless, the D.C.
Circuit viewed the mandate as demanding ideological speech and therefore found the disclosure requirement unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
In effect, wrote the court, a company subject to the
requirement had “to tell consumers that its products
are ethically tainted.” The mandate required a business to assume “moral responsibility for the Congo
war” even in the case of a company that “condemns
the atrocities of the Congo war in the strongest terms”
and “may disagree with that assessment of its moral
responsibility.”76
If manufacturers cannot be forced to weigh in on
the morality of Congo minerals, one would expect
that physicians cannot be forced to weigh in on the
morality of abortion. Yet the Eighth Circuit permitted South Dakota’s ideological mandate in Rounds.
South Dakota requires physicians to tell their abortion patients that the abortion “will terminate the life
of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”77 In
the court’s view, this mandate entailed factual rather
than ideological speech because the statute included
a definition of “human being” in the definitions section of the law, according to which human being
means an “individual living member of the species of
Homo sapiens, including the unborn human being
during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full gestation.”78 Of course, South Dakota
does not require physicians to include the statutory
definition of human being in their disclosures, and
even if physicians discuss the statutory definition,
it still represents ideological speech — that a fetus
is a human being.79 If the Congo minerals mandate
was ideological, surely the human being mandate is
ideological.80
Just as courts differ on the meaning of ideological speech, they differ on the meaning of misleading
speech. Consider an internal disagreement in the
Eight Circuit in a challenge to South Dakota’s mandate regarding the risks of suicide from abortion.
As mentioned earlier, South Dakota requires physicians to disclose “all known medical risks” of abortion, including the existence of an “[i]ncreased risk of
suicide ideation and suicide.”81 Because studies have
not found that having an abortion increases the risk
14

for suicide, a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the provision “violates doctors’ First
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech
that is untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant.”82 However, sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit reversed the
panel and upheld the suicide risk mandate. According to the en banc majority, stating that there is an
“increased risk” of suicide among women who have
had an abortion does not mean that there is a causal
relationship between abortion and suicide. Rather,
wrote the majority, an increased risk is an appropriate
way to characterize an association, and there was evidence to support the claim that there is a statistically
significant correlation between having an abortion
and having an increased risk of suicide.83
It is difficult to square the en banc court’s opinion
with the requirement that speech mandates not mislead. Women told that there is an increased risk of
suicide with abortion are likely to incorrectly conclude
that having an abortion will increase their risk of suicide rather than correctly concluding that women who
choose an abortion have a higher risk of suicide for
other reasons.

Sufficient Standards for Permissible
Abortion Speech Mandates
If the requirements for truthful speech mandates and
non-ideological mandates can be manipulated, should
other standards be added to limit the ability of legislatures to violate principles of informed consent and
freedom of speech? Additional distinctions raise their
own concerns. Moreover, they would be subject to the
same problem of judicial manipulation.
What other standards might be invoked to reject
speech mandates for abortion? For example, is it a
problem if the state takes sides on a matter that is controversial?84 Is it a problem if the state tries to manipulate a woman’s decision making process by appealing
to emotion? Is it a problem if the government requires
health care providers to show graphic images to pregnant women before an abortion?85
That information takes sides, is designed to appeal
to emotion, or is presented in a graphic fashion should
not automatically disqualify a speech mandate. In
many cases, such information can promote better
decision making. Some mandates for biased, emotionladen, or graphic information are problematic, but they
usually are problematic because they require untruthful or misleading speech or because they require ideological speech.86 There may be some limits on the
degree to which a speech mandate takes sides, appeals
to emotions, or is graphic, but a mandate should not
be rejected simply because it takes sides, may appeal to
emotion rather than reason, or is graphic.
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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Taking Sides
Perhaps it is wrong for the government to favor one
choice over another. If the government tries to influence the woman’s decision, it does not seem respectful
of the woman’s autonomy. Under Roe v. Wade,87 the
Supreme Court required the government to remain
neutral about a woman’s decision whether to abort
her fetus. The Court therefore rejected many informed
consent mandates on the ground that the state was
trying to influence the woman’s decision in favor of
childbirth.88 In Casey, the Court concluded that the
state need not remain neutral, but was free to promote
an interest in the preservation of fetal life, as long as

reflect their preferences. And one can make the same
argument about abortion speech mandates. A woman
worried about her finances may not feel that she cannot afford to raise a child. But when informed about
the father’s obligation to provide support, she might
decide she could afford childrearing.
It should not be a problem simply because the government tries to influence people’s decisions by requiring that they be given more information by companies
or physicians. For example, it should not be a problem
if a state requires physicians to provide truthful information about support services for new mothers in the
hope that more women will choose childbirth over

If the doctrine of informed consent is designed to ensure that patients make
their decisions after carefully considering the advantages and disadvantages
of their options, we might worry if decisions are driven by emotion rather than
reason. Emotional factors might result in a patient forgoing the choice that best
reflects the patient’s genuine preferences. Should speech mandates therefore
be prohibited if they would exploit the emotions of the listeners or viewers?
its speech mandates were truthful and not misleading.89 Did the Casey Court wrongly reverse course on
this question?
If the Court returned to its pre-Casey doctrine and
prohibited speech mandates that reflect an effort by
government to influence individual decision making, most health-related speech mandates would be
suspect.90 Governments often pass speech mandates
precisely because they worry about the decisions that
people make. Nutritional labeling mandates have
been adopted because lawmakers think that many
people make poor choices about their diet. Tobacco
warnings have been required for cigarette manufacturers because lawmakers think that many people
make poor choices about smoking. Lawmakers adopt
speech mandates because they believe that consumers
would make better choices if they had more information about their decisions.
Of course, what it means to make a “better” choice
is an important question. Let us assume it means a
choice that the person would want to make if the person truly understood all that was at stake with the
decision.91 For example, a consumer would forgo a
food option once the person realized how much fat,
how many calories, or how much salt the food contained. Or a consumer would abstain from smoking
once the person realized that tobacco causes cancer.
With health-related speech mandates, the government can help people make decisions that better

abortion. Nor should it be a problem if a state requires
cigarette manufacturers to provide truthful information about the health risks of tobacco in the hope that
fewer people will smoke.
Rather, it is a problem if the government misleads
the public in its efforts to influence personal decision
making or compels others to deliver speech that is ideological in nature. Thus, for example, the Constitution
should prevent states from trying to discourage abortion by forcing physicians to provide inaccurate information, such as claims that an abortion will increase
the woman’s risk of suicide or breast cancer. The Constitution also should prevent states from trying to discourage abortion by forcing physicians to voice the
government’s view about the moral status of a fetus.
In other words, concerns about the government taking sides are already addressed by the standards that
speech mandates may require only truthful and nonmisleading information and that the mandates not
require ideological speech.92
Manipulating Emotions
If the doctrine of informed consent is designed to
ensure that patients make their decisions after carefully considering the advantages and disadvantages of
their options, we might worry if decisions are driven
by emotion rather than reason.93 Emotional factors
might result in a patient forgoing the choice that best
reflects the patient’s genuine preferences. Should
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speech mandates therefore be prohibited if they would
exploit the emotions of the listeners or viewers?
In the context of abortion, Carol Sanger has criticized mandates to show ultrasound images to pregnant women. According to Sanger, these mandates try
to overpower the woman’s reason by “triggering something like a primitive maternal instinct.”94 Ultrasound
images are more likely, argues Sanger, to distort judgment than to inform it.95 Caroline Corbin also worries
that ultrasound images can distort the decision making process. For both Sanger and Corbin, the social
significance of a fetal ultrasound image in the United
States is the image of an infant — of the pregnant
woman’s child.96 As a result, the decision to abort one’s
fetus may feel more like a decision to kill one’s baby.97
Appeals to emotion cannot be categorically rejected.98
All decision making reflects the intersection of reason
and emotion.99 Indeed, emotion and reason are both
required to make decisions — “the ability to decide
depends upon the ability to feel.”100 This is because
emotions help us to interpret, organize, and
prioritize the information that bombards us.…
We cannot function without creating markers
of saliency and value, and our emotions aid us
in identifying which information is especially
salient, valuable, or urgent.…In short, emotions help shape the…cognitive tools that are
essential to the continuing task of information
processing.101
Moreover, objections based on appeals to emotion can
have the undesirable effect of suggesting that women
are untrustworthy decision makers because of their
emotional vulnerability.102
While there are few studies on the question, published data suggest that the viewing of ultrasound
images can actually play a positive role for women
undergoing abortion. In a Canadian study, for example,
women were given the option of viewing the ultrasound
images as the procedure was being performed, and
more than 70 percent of the women chose to view.103
Among those who viewed the ultrasound, viewing did
not make the abortion more difficult emotionally for
more than 83 percent of the women.104 Indeed, typical comments from the women indicated that viewing
the ultrasound made it easier for them to undergo the
abortion.105 In another study that was conducted in
South Africa, half of the women that participated were
offered the opportunity to view the ultrasound while
it was being performed.106 Among those who viewed
the ultrasound, nearly three-fourths said they would
want to view the ultrasound if they needed an abortion in the future.107 These positive data may reflect the
16

fact that the overwhelming percentage of abortions are
performed in the first trimester. Women may expect
to see a miniature baby on the ultrasound, but all that
may be present is a gestational sac.108
In another study, with a much larger number of
participants109 and that was conducted in the United
States (Planned Parenthood in Los Angeles), researchers examined whether viewing an ultrasound would
change women’s minds about abortion.110 At the clinics studied, ultrasounds were routinely performed,
and patients were offered the opportunity to view
the ultrasound. More than 40 percent of the women
chose to view the ultrasound, and for the most part,
viewing did not affect the decision whether to abort.111
However, for the 7 percent of women who came to the
clinic with a low to medium level of certainty about
having an abortion, there appeared to be a small effect
on their decision making in the direction of carrying
the fetus to term.112
More studies are needed to inform the question,
but the data to date suggest that it makes sense for
physicians to offer women the opportunity to view
their ultrasounds when they are having ultrasounds
performed. A substantial minority, if not a majority,
of women want to view the ultrasound, the viewing is
generally a positive experience, and for a small number
of women who are uncertain whether to have an abortion, the ultrasound may influence their thinking.113
If we cannot reject appeals to emotion as a general
matter, or even the specific appeal of an ultrasound
image, can we reject some appeals to emotion because
they are too extreme? Once again, we come back to
the standard that speech mandates must be truthful
and non-misleading. Emotional appeals that rely on
deception are not acceptable.114
Graphic Images
Related to the concern about appeals to emotion is the
concern about the use of graphic images. We might
worry that powerful images can be overly persuasive by
leading viewers to ignore important factual information.
It is difficult to see why legal doctrine should distinguish between dry text and graphic images. The goal
of informed consent doctrine is to ensure that patients
develop a meaningful understanding of their options
before making a decision. And many people will more
readily understand information that is delivered
graphically — sometimes a picture really is worth a
thousand words. Hence, Congress passed legislation
in 2009 requiring the traditional textual warnings on
cigarette packages to be paired with images that illustrate the harms of smoking,115 and many states require
physicians to offer women the opportunity to view pic-
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tures of fetuses or images from their own fetal ultrasound before an abortion.116
Whether in the context of smoking or abortion,
graphic images can provide a better understanding
of the considerations important to the person’s decision. For abortion, it will be relevant for many women
whether the fetus is still a blob of tissue or has developed many of the features of a person. An abortion
at six weeks can be a very different decision than an
abortion at eighteen weeks. As discussed in the preceding section, ultrasound images often can serve the
purposes of informed consent.117

graphic images of people with the illness the immunization protects against. Suppose in particular that
the images included cases in which an immunocompromised individual dies from chicken pox or measles.
If the images would more effectively communicate to
the parents the importance of immunization, then it
is difficult to see why the images should be prohibited.
To be sure, some graphic images may be problematic.
In particular, graphic images can mislead patients.
For example, if an ultrasound image of a woman’s
fetus is magnified so that it appears to be larger than
its actual size, as is often the case with first-trimester

As I have discussed, courts can draw a good balance between principles
of informed consent and the First Amendment by ensuring that abortion
speech mandates are truthful, not misleading, and not ideological. Some
courts have not employed these standards with sufficient bite, as when the
Eighth Circuit permitted misleading statements about the risk of suicide
from abortion, but the answer to that problem is for the Supreme Court
to insist that the standards be applied more rigorously.
But is there a problem if images are too graphic?
Should women really be confronted with ultrasounds
of their fetuses before an abortion? After all, we do not
expect patients to view videotapes of heart surgery before
they undergo their own operations.118 Perhaps an image
mandate would be designed for its shock value rather
than for its ability to convey factual information.119
On the other hand, we can imagine some very
graphic images that would be desirable. Consider a
hypothetical informed consent statute for immunization. In recent years, the United States has seen a
significant increase in the incidence of childhood diseases that are preventable with vaccines (e.g., measles
and chicken pox). These increases reflect the fact
that parents are more likely than in the past to refuse
immunizations for their children. To some extent,
the willingness to reject immunization reflects the
success of immunization in nearly eliminating oncecommon childhood communicable diseases. Because
parents today are far less familiar than were generations past with the impact of these infections,120 they
may discount the benefits of vaccination. Moreover,
they may discount the benefits not only for their own
children but also for individuals who cannot be vaccinated because of compromised immune function
or other medical conditions.121 Suppose, then, that a
state wanted to address the declining rate of immunization by requiring pediatricians to show parents

pregnancies, the pregnant woman would be given an
inaccurate sense of the fetus’ nature.122 One can generally protect against inappropriate graphic images by
requiring that they be truthful and not misleading.
It is possible to imagine graphic images that would be
accurate but unacceptable. For example, suppose a legislature required women to watch a video of a physician
dismembering a fetus during an abortion. But images
that extreme have not been mandated. If such a mandate
were enacted, then it would be necessary to establish a
standard for identifying images that are too graphic.

Conclusion
As I have discussed, courts can draw a good balance
between principles of informed consent and the First
Amendment by ensuring that abortion speech mandates
are truthful, not misleading, and not ideological. Some
courts have not employed these standards with sufficient
bite, as when the Eighth Circuit permitted misleading
statements about the risk of suicide from abortion, but
the answer to that problem is for the Supreme Court to
insist that the standards be applied more rigorously.
In that regard, a number of scholars have criticized
courts for their differential treatment of speech mandates for companies and speech mandates for abortion
providers.123 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit struck down the Food and Drug
Administration’s proposed graphic warnings for ciga-
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rette packages124 while the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit upheld Texas’ ultrasound image viewing statute.125 There were good reasons for the tobacco
warnings, and they should have been upheld.126
As the examples from corporate speech and physician
speech illustrate, there are problems with both overenforcement and underenforcement of the requirements
that speech mandates be truthful, not misleading, and
not ideological. Unfortunately, in its approach to speech
mandates for tobacco companies — or its approach on
the Congo minerals disclosure127 — the D.C. Circuit did
not give the government sufficient leeway to require
informational disclosures (the overenforcement problem). On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit (and the
Eighth Circuit128) have given government too much
authority to impose disclosures in the context of abortion speech mandates (the underenforcement problem). Accordingly, when it next addresses the question
of speech mandates that are designed to better inform
the public, the Supreme Court needs to provide sufficient guidance to avoid problems of both overenforcement and underenforcement.
But adding new standards to supplement the standards regarding truth and ideology will not be useful.
Additional standards would give weight to the wrong
factors, and in any event, would be the subject to the
same problems of overenforcement and underenforcement that currently exist with appropriate standards
for judging speech mandates.129
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